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1. Introduction
During the last three decades, the literature on heterogeneous agent models has
explored various types of frictions and heterogeneity to explain stylized facts
obtained from firm and household level data. While recent modeling advances
have made it possible to evaluate the business cycle implications of agent het-
erogeneity1, identifying the interaction between financial frictions, aggregate
shocks and heterogeneity from the data is still a challenging task. Credibly
producing such evidence can shed light on what kind of business cycle facts
we should strive to explain or heterogeneous agents models should be able to
replicate. Along this line of research, a recent strand of the literature focuses
on estimates of the distribution of the marginal propensities to consume, which
can be used as a sufficient statistic for computing the impact effect of a policy
shock in economies with idiosyncratic risk2. Nevertheless, aggregate shocks can
also alter the way heterogeneity matters for aggregate fluctuations.
This paper develops a methodology to identify the role of financial frictions
and heterogeneity in the determination of the economy’s response to aggregate
shocks. Using an approximated heterogeneous agent (HA) model around the
representative agent (RA) allocation, it illustrates that financial frictions gen-
erate distortions to aggregates along different margins. The latter depend on
cross sectional moments e.g. the cross sectional dispersion in consumption and
the marginal revenue product of firms, as well as the extensive and intensive
margin of adjustment of households and firms which are financially constrained
e.g. the proportion that is indeed constrained and by how much, on average.
These moments are either directly observable but possibly at a lower frequency
than macroeconomic variables, or they are partially unobserved, but can be un-
covered using information from aggregated qualitative and quantitative survey
data. Qualitative data include questions that directly reveal the status of each
1See i.e. Ahn, Kaplan, Moll, Winberry, and Wolf (2017); Challe, Matheron, Ragot, and
Rubio-Ramirez (2017).
2See Farhi and Werning (2016); Auclert, Rognlie, and Straub (2018b); Auclert (2017) for
a partial and a general equilibrium setting and Chetty (2009) for a review of the sufficient
statistics approach to program evaluation.
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respondent while quantitative micro data provide measures of cross sectional
dispersion over time.
The paper utilizes restrictions that hold across alternative models, hence the
parameters of the benchmark representative agent model and the wedges that
are generated by heterogeneity and frictions are not necessarily point identi-
fied. Nevertheless, the approximation used imposes additional cross equation
restrictions, and the additional information contained in survey data permits the
identification of the interaction of heterogeneity and the intensive and extensive
margins of adjustment with aggregate shocks. Furthermore, the link between
measurements and all unobservables is formulated in a Gaussian state space
model, which explicitly controls for both the fact that surveys are available at
different frequencies and for the presence of errors in measurements.
The methodology is used to identify distortions due to consumer and firm fi-
nancial frictions in the Spanish economy. Empirical results indicate rich in-
teractions. Shocks to the ex-ante real interest rate have significant effects on
these margins while government spending shocks seem to explain more than a
third of the unconditional variation in most of the observables. The response
of output to spending shocks is significantly affected by heterogeneity, either in
consumer spending or the marginal revenue product of firms while the extensive
margin of investment constrained firms has the most important contribution in
terms of size. There are also important feedback effects between heterogeneity
and aggregate shocks, as well as the proportion of constrained consumers and
firms.
Another finding is that despite that the model does not hard-wire a New Key-
nesian mechanism, markups are found to be countercyclical conditioning on
government spending shocks, while there is no clear evidence on the cyclicality
with respect to the real interest rate and aggregate productivity.
1.1. Contribution and contacts with the literature. This paper relates
to the literature that compares the predictions of HANK (Heterogeneous Agent
New Keynesian) models and approximations to them like the TANK (Two agent
NK) model and their differences to the representative agent model (RANK).
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Kaplan and Violante (2018) illustrate that the extent of the difference in pre-
dictions depends on the type of shock we consider. Debortoli and Gali (2018)
use a second order approximation and find that the TANK model can quantita-
tively approximate the dynamics of the HANK model reasonably well. Whether
variations in consumption heterogeneity and the corresponding proportion of
constrained consumers matter empirically, quoting Debortoli and Gali (2018),
"remains an open question".
This paper employs a similar approximation and offers a general methodology
to tackle this issue while it is not tied to a specific mechanism. More particu-
larly, measuring the proportion of agents that are constrained over time provides
evidence on the variability of this proportion and how it interacts with aggre-
gate shocks. In TANK models, this proportion is taken as fixed and exogenous.
Second, as shown in Section 3, the representation used captures aggregate pre-
cautionary effects from anticipating binding constraints in the future, something
that is also not taken into account by the TANK model. Accounting for these
effects can shed light on their relative importance3. Moreover, this proportion
can also provide information for identifying the variance of consumption when it
is latent at higher frequencies as well as when the variance is primarily affected
by the constrained households.
Methodology-wise, the paper asks two interrelated questions: (a) Given the
approximation, does there exist a corresponding law of motion within which the
complete markets allocation is smoothly embedded? (b) Is this approximation
adequate for empirically approximating the law of motion of a HA economy with
aggregate uncertainty? Providing an answer to the first question is important
for a few reasons: If the complete markets’ allocation is a smooth special case
of the aggregate law of motion of the approximate HA model then a likelihood
function can be easily constructed. Moreover, if the additional components
generated by heterogeneity are tightly connected to the structural parameters,
they can be linked to any kind of data that can be potentially informative,
which matters for identification. For the second question, showing that this is
3Precautionary savings and binding constraints are expected to generate similar behavior, see
e.g. Carroll (2001); Carroll and Kimball (2001).
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a good approximation for the workhorse model is re-assuring and a useful first
step.
The answer is affirmative for both questions. The paper shows that there exists
a law of motion that is a distortion to the representative agent allocation which
is linearly related to the distortion of the aggregate first order conditions. More-
over, the mapping between the former and the latter indeed imposes additional
cross equation restrictions. Furthermore, within the context of the benchmark
Krusell and Smith (1998) economy (KS hereafter), the empirical approxima-
tion is precise, under parameterizations that imply alternative degrees of self-
insurance. For the benchmark parameterization, where risk aversion and the
discount factor are reasonably "high" and on par with standard values used in
the literature for model calibration, consumption variance is mainly driven by
aggregate shocks. When both are low enough, consumption variance cannot
be entirely explained by aggregate shocks, yet all macroeconomic variables are
still well approximated. What is more important is that the paper’s approach
controls for distributional effects should approximate aggregation does not hold
and for their dependence on aggregate shocks.
The paper’s approximation to the HA model generates cross sectional moments
as well as aggregate wedges in investment and consumption. One important
cross sectional moment that arises is the dispersion in consumption shares, an
observation that goes back to Constantinides and Duffie (1996). Another mo-
ment, more specific to the model used in estimation, is the cross sectional dis-
persion in the marginal product of firms, which is the outcome of heterogeneous
capital utilization rates. In turn, consumption and investment are distorted
from those agents (consumers and/or firms) that are hitting their constraint,
which can be decomposed into an intensive and an extensive margin without
imposing any additional assumption. The additional step is to link these wedges
to aggregate shocks which provides direct evidence on their relationship but also
the quantitative impact on aggregate outcomes. As illustrated in the applica-
tion, this is relevant for quantifying the effects of fiscal policy during recessions
on aggregate consumption. This contributes to the voluminous literature on
the effects of government purchases to macroeconomic aggregates, summarized
in Ramey (2019a).
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In recent work, Berger, Dovis, and Bocola (2018) measure the implications of
incomplete markets for the business cycle by utilizing that trading constraints
lead to a representative agent aggregate Euler equation with a time varying
discount factor4. While I also consider a distorted Euler equation, the employed
representation is linked to both micro and data across the business cycle in
one step. This informs parameter estimates as well as identifying the different
margins and their dependence on aggregate shocks.
Chang, Chen, and Schorfheide (2018) propose a Bayesian reduced form method-
ology for identifying the interaction of heterogeneity and macroeconomic out-
comes. Liu and Plagborg-Møller (2019) propose a Bayesian full information
method to estimate a HA model using macro and micro data. This paper is
similar in spirit and complements these papers. It differs by employing the
second order approximation to a HA model, which easily lends itself to con-
ventional likelihood based methods. Moreover, being quasi-structural, it does
not adhere to a specific mechanism that generates distortions and heterogeneity
and can therefore identify interactions that could otherwise be ignored due to
misspecification, while it allows for computing certain counterfactuals.
In a companion paper, Tryphonides (2020) studies credible identification of
structural parameters through moment inequalities (limited information) and
the role of the extensive margin in improving inference by shrinking the set of
admissible estimates. This paper builds on this approach by developing the
"full information" counterpart5, which provides a general framework that can be
used to do likelihood based inference in this setting. This is important as state
space methods allow for greater flexibility in linking aggregated micro-surveys
to different components of the approximated HA model.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the KS
model as well as the second order approximation to illustrate the issue at hand.
Section 3 presents the result on the link between aggregate wedges and the
equilibrium law of motion. Section 4 presents the experiments on the quality of
4This is pinned down by the unconstrained agent with the highest bond valuation. The
authors also refer to similar results of Werning (2016) and Krueger and Lustig (2010).
5We cannot call this a proper full information approach as agents are boundedly rational, yet
the econometrician and the agents have the same information set with an infinite sample.
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the empirical approximation. Section 5 presents the extensive study of the role
of heterogeneity and financial frictions in Spain and Section 6 concludes.
2. The Krusell and Smith (1998) economy
In order to build intuition for the approximation of the HA economy, I first
introduce the KS model. Adopting the formulation in Maliar, Maliar, and Valli
(2010); Haan, Judd, and Juillard (2010), the KS economy features a standard
capital accumulation problem under incomplete markets, where the first order
conditions for each household are as follows:
c´ωi,t “ βEtp1´ δ` rkt`1qc´ωi,t`1`λi,t
ki,t`1 “ p1´ τqwtl¯i`νtwtp1´ iq`p1´ δ` rkt qki,t´ ci,t
ki,t`1 ě 0
where i P t0,1u is the idiosyncratic employment shock, l¯ the time endowment
and vt the fraction of the wage that is received as unemployment benefit. The
first equation is the standard Euler equation which is distorted due to the occa-
sionally binding borrowing constraint, while the second equation is the budget
constraint, which nests the case of employment and unemployment.
Perfectly competitive markets imply that the interest and wage rates are equal
to the marginal products of capital and labor:
rkt “ Ztα
ˆ
Kt
l¯Lt
˙α´1
, wt “ Ztp1´αq
ˆ
Kt
l¯Lt
˙α
while the labor income tax rate is designed to be equal to τ “ νtut
l¯Lt
.
The only source of aggregate risk is the aggregate productivity shock Zt which
takes two values,
 
Zlow,Zhigh
(
. In turn, the unemployment rate ut depends on
the productivity shock as well, and takes two possible values,
 
ulow,uhigh
(
, with
transition matrix P “ ppll,plh;phl,phhq. Finally, full employment is normalized
to one, thus L“ 1´u.
Second Order Approximation. Under complete markets, individual consumption
is proportional to aggregate consumption and the consumption shares do not
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vary over time. A reasonable point of approximation to individual marginal util-
ity would therefore be the marginal utility of the representative agent6:
c´ωi,t « C´ωt ´ωC´ω´1t pci,t´Ctq`
ωpω`1q
2 C
´ω´2
t pci,t´Ctq2
Denote by si,t “ pi,t,ki,tq the vector of idiosyncratic states and the distribution
of idiosyncratic states conditional on aggregate states by ppsi,t|Stq. In a rational
expectations equilibrium, agent expectations are formed using ppsi,t`1,St`1|si,t,Stq.
Aggregating the Euler equation using ppsi,t|Stq yields the following condition:
C´ωt “ βEtp1´ δ` rkt`1q
ˆ
Ξt`1
Ξt
˙
C´ωt`1`
ˆ
λi,tppsi,t|Stqdsi,t
:“ βEtp1´ δ` rkt`1q
ˆ
Ξt`1
Ξt
˙
C´ωt`1`µc,t(1)
where7
Ct`1 ”
ˆ
ci,t`1ppsi,t`1,si,t|St`1,Stqdpsi,t`1,si,tq, Ct ”
ˆ
ci,tppsi,t|Stqdsi,t
Ξt ” 1` ωpω`1q2 C
´2
t V arpci,tq, Ξt,t`1 ” 1` ωpω`1q2 C
´2
t`1V arpci,t`1q
V arpci,tq “
ˆ
pci,t´Ctq2ppsi,t|Stqdsi,t
V arpci,t`1q “
ˆ
pci,t`1´Ct`1q2ppsi,t`1,si,t|St`1,Stqdpsi,t`1,si,tq
The aggregate distortion to (1) may not vanish in general equilibrium, and
will depend on the aggregate states, St. Moreover, notice that µct involves
adjustments on the extensive and the intensive margin i.e. it depends on the
proportion of households that adjust pi : λi,t ą 0q and by how much.
The aggregated Euler equation can now be analysed, both non-linearly or using
log-linearization techniques. We will proceed with the latter. More particularly,
the log-linearized version of (1) is as follows:
C˜t “ βp1´ δ` rkssqEt
ˆ
C˜t`1´ 1
ω
∆Ξ˜t`1´ r
k
ss
ωp1´ δ` rkssq r˜
k
t
˙
` µ˜c,t(2)
and together with the rest of the conditions they form a rational expectations
system, as in the RA case. Note that as is evident form the second order
6See also Debortoli and Gali (2018), Tryphonides (2020).
7Under complete markets, marginal utility growth is equal across agents and the RA approx-
imation becomes exact, C´ωt “ βEtC´ωt`1p1´ δ` rkt`1q.
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approximation, the cross sectional moments can be part of the state space e.g.
in the second order approximation, the cross sectional variance appears as an
additional state variable. In the case in which the whole distribution becomes
a state variable, then an uncountable number of moments could be in principle
used to represent this economy, and hence the computational issue that Krusell
and Smith (1998) have tried to tackle.
Before presenting the complete log-linearized system of the KS economy, I
present the theoretical results about the relation between the law of motion
of the representative agent and the approximated HA model. These results are
general, in the sense that they do not only apply to the HA model, but to any
model that can be described as a distortion to some benchmark. In this case
the benchmark case in the RA allocation8.
3. The distorted equilibrium law of motion
To generalize the analysis I adopt the following notation: Let Xt denote the
aggregate endogenous variables and Zt the aggregate shocks e.g. St :“ pXt,Ztq1.
Then the system of aggregate equilibrium conditions becomes as follows:
GpθqXt “ F pθqEtpXt`1|Xtq`LpθqZt` µ˜t(3)
Zt “ RpθqZt´1` t
Under complete markets, the model reduces to the frictionless representative
agent model, where µ˜t “ 0 and the cross sectional moments in Xt become re-
dundant. I thus assume that a subset of parameters in θ, say θ2, is also set to
zero. In the context of the KS model, this can correspond to eliminating Ξ˜t, the
log-linearized version of the cross sectional consumption variance, which does
not appear under complete markets. The vector θ is thus partitioned into two
8This is also related to the wedge literature initiated by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007)
(CKM) who identify wedges in the optimality conditions of a frictionless model that produce
the same equilibrium allocations in economies with specific parametric choices for the frictions.
We also take a frictionless model as a benchmark but contrary to CKM we show that there
is a precise mapping from wedges to distortions in the decision rules, and thus additional
cross equation restrictions that are important for identifying how the distortions depend on
aggregate shocks.
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subsets, pθ1, θ2q, and the frictionless economy is summarized by:
Gpθ1,0qXt “ F pθ1,0qEtpXt`1|Xt,Ztq`Lpθ1,0qZt(4)
Zt “ RpθqZt´1` t
Therefore, X‹t “ P ˚pθ1,0q
nxˆnx
Xt´1`Q˚pθ1,0q
nxˆnz
Zt is a Rational Expectations equilib-
rium if there exist unique matrices P ˚pθ1,0q,Q˚pθ1,0q such that the following
conditions are satisfied9:
pF pθ1,0qP ˚pθ1,0q´G˚pθ1,0qqP ˚pθ1,0q “ 0
pRpθqT bF pθ1,0q` IzbpF pθ1,0qP ˚pθ1,0q´G˚pθ1,0qqqvecpQpθ1,0qq
“ ´vecpLpθ1,0qq
Correspondingly, we can always rewrite (3) as follows:
Gpθ1,0qXt “ F pθ1,0qEtpXt`1|Xtq`Lpθ1,0qZt`µt(5)
where µt subsumes both µ˜t and the difference between (3) and (4) due to setting
θ2 “ 0. We could have differentiated between distortions that appear in the
expectational component (e.g. Ξt in the KS economy) and the rest of the
model. Nevertheless, while this complicates notation, it makes no difference
to the main result that follows as in equilibrium, Ξt will be a function of the
aggregate states. The next proposition characterizes the relationship between
µt and a set of candidate aggregate decision rules that are distortions of the RA
law of motion.
Proposition 1. For matrices pM1,M2q such that µt “M1Xt´1`M2Zt:
(1) There exists a distorted aggregate rule Xt “X‹t `λt which satisfies (5)
(2) There exists a matrix H such that λt “Hµt, where the following restric-
tions hold:
vecpHq “ `M 11bGpθ1,0q´pM1P ‹pθ1,θ2qq1bF pθ1,0qq˘´1 vecpM1q
vecpM2q “
`
Inz bpGpθ1,0qH´ Inxq´R1bF pθ1,0qH
˘´1ˆ`pM1Q‹pθ1,θ2qq1bF pθ1,0q˘vecpHq
9See for example Marimon and Scott (1998).
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and pP ‹pθ1, θ2q,Q‹pθ1, θ2qq is the Rational Expectations solution to (5).
Proof. See the Appendix 
This existence result allows us to directly parameterize the distortions µt in (5)
by µt “M1Xt´1`M2Zt, solve the system using the conventional QZ decompo-
sition and construct a likelihood function that depends on the structural param-
eters, as well as pM1,M2q. The cross-equation restrictions that appear in Propo-
sition 1 imply that there is a tight link between θ1 and pθ2,vecpM1q,vecpM2qq,
which is important for identification.
The assumption that µt is a linear function of the states is an implicit assump-
tion that the average value of xi,t and zi,t is sufficient to predict distortions.
This does not imply that we invoke a representative agent equivalence as Xt
can possibly include higher moments of the distribution, as shown in the context
of the KS model e.g. the cross sectional variance component Ξt.
Moreover, since µ˜t is partially determined by the proportion of constrained
agents, in equilibrium, a positive probability of someone being constrained in
the future will imply an aggregate precautionary effect, captured by H.
A limitation of the above proposition is the assumption of linearity. Never-
theless, most of the recent literature on computing HA models with aggregate
shocks focuses on linear representations which makes it a useful starting point,
see e.g. Reiter (2009); Auclert, Rognlie, and Straub (2018a); Boppart, Krusell,
and Mitman (2017).
Based on these results, I next investigate whether the approximation performs
well under parameterizations that imply a varying degree of self-insurance,
which changes the exposure of households to idiosyncratic risk.
4. Evaluating the empirical approximation to the KS economy
Since employment also depends on the aggregate shock, I redefine aggregate
productivity to include labor as e.g. ZL,t :“ ZtL1´αt . The second order approx-
imation to the KS economy yields the following first order conditions
Kt`1 “ Kαt l¯1´αZL,t`p1´ δqKt´Ct
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rkt “ αKα´1t l¯1´αZL,t
ZL,t “
´
p1´ulowq1´αZlow1low`p1´uhighq1´αZhigh1high
¯
(6)
C´ωt “ βEtp1´ δ` rkt`1q
ˆ
Ξt`1
Ξt
˙
C´ωt`1`µt
where 1high is equal to one when the productivity level is high. In order to obtain
a model that does not involve a discrete set of jumps for the productivity shock,
I also approximate the indicator functions for the state of productivity using a
logistic function: 1high « 11`e´ζpZt´Zssq , where Zss is the unconditional mean of
the two state process and ζ is large enough such that the continuous process
approximates the two state process well.
Log-linearizing the resulting system around the non-stochastic steady state and
utilizing the result in Proposition 1, the approximating model which is estimable
using conventional (Bayesian) methods becomes as follows:
K˜t`1 “
ˆ
1´ css
kss
˙
K˜t` css
kss
C˜t` ζkα´1ss γ12 ZssZ˜t
r˜kt “ pα´1qK˜t` ζ2
γ1
γ1`2γ0Zt
Z˜t “ ρZt´1`ez,t
C˜t “ βp1´ δ` rkssqEt
ˆ
C˜t`1´ 1
ω
pΞ˜t`1´ Ξ˜tq´ r
k
ss
ωp1´ δ` rkssq r˜
k
t
˙
` µ˜c,t
µ˜c,t “ m1K˜t`m2Z˜t
Ξ˜t “ ξ1K˜t` ξ2Z˜t
where pm1,m2, ξ1, ξ2q are the additional parameters10 and
css
kss
“´δ`kα´1ss pγ0` γ12 q, r
k
ss “ αkα´1ss pγ0` γ12 q, ρ“ pZhigh´Zlowqpphh´plhq
ζ
2
γ0 “ l¯1´α p1´ulowq1´αZlow, γ1 “ l¯1´α
´
p1´uhighq1´αZhigh´p1´ulowq1´αZlow
¯
10In Proposition 1, pM1,M2q will depend on pm1,m2, ξ1, ξ2q. Also, notice that Ξ˜ is propor-
tional to the variance of the consumption ratio, so directly parameterizing the former is with
no loss of generality.
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Estimation Experiments. I adopt the same parameterization and solution
method as in Maliar, Maliar, and Valli (2010); Haan, Judd, and Juillard (2010)
to generate data from this economy11. In particular, I simulate 1400 periods
and keep the last 400 as the pseudo-sample. Since there is only one shock,
a normally distributed measurement error with variance equal to 1% of the
variances is added to the observables. Based on this sample, I estimate the
free parameters of the log-linear approximating model using all variables as
observables. Below, I plot the simulated data against their (Kalman) filtered
values using the estimated model parameters pζ,m1,m2, ξ1, ξ2,σZq evaluated at
the median of the parameter draws. In theory, if the approximation error is
negligible, the two time series should coincide.
The quality of the approximation is expected to be very high given the "ap-
proximate aggregation result" in KS. The Krusell-Smith equilibrium computes
an allocation where the log linear law of motion of the capital stock is sufficient
to predict future prices. Nevertheless, as mentioned in their original work, this
is not necessarily a self-fulfilling equilibrium, but there is a fundamental reason
for which this equilibrium features aggregation. The agents who hold most of
the wealth are well insured against idionycratic risk and are expected to be-
have more like permanent income consumers. The lower the patience and risk
aversion, the worse the quality of the approximation is expected to be.
On the other hand, what is less clear a priori is whether the approximation
will be able to track the evolution of the cross sectional variance of consump-
tion and whether the dependence of the variance of shocks is going to be well
identified. Proposition 1 illustrates that the cross-equation restrictions can aid
identification.
Experiment 1: Benchmark parameterization pω “ 2, β “ 0.99). In this exper-
iment the value of the preference parameters imply highly patient agents with
reasonable levels of risk aversion. The approximation performs very well for
11β “ 0.99,γ “ 2,α“ 0.36, δ “ 0.025,Zhigh “ 1.01,Zlow “ 0.99,ν “ 0.15, l¯“ 10.9 ,uh “ 0.04,ul “
0.1.
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macroeconomic aggregates, that is consumption and the capital stock. More-
over, the (log) variance of the consumption shares exhibits significant fluctua-
tions, but is mainly driven by the two aggregate states, and thus our representa-
tion is sufficient to capture the dynamics. In the Appendix, I present the results
from the second experiment under adverse parameterization (less patient, less
risk averse households). As expected, since agents are more exposed to idiosyn-
cratic risk, the variance of consumption cannot be perfectly predicted by the
aggregate states. Nevertheless macroeconomic aggregates are still predicted to
a high degree of accuracy.
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Figure 1. Aggregate Consumption (Upper), Variance of Con-
sumption Shares (Lower)
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Figure 2. Aggregate Capital Stock
Having shown that this approximation works well, the next section studies finan-
cial frictions in Spain through the lens of a more elaborate HA model informed
by aggregate and micro-survey data.
5. Heterogeneity and Financial Frictions in Spain
Spain has experienced a severe financial crisis during the period 2008-2014. The
initial boom, which was led by unrestrained credit growth and manifested into
a housing bubble, was succeeded by a deep recession, a rise in firm bankrupt-
cies, household deleveraging and a large drop in investment. Figure 3 plots
the cyclical components for consumption, investment and output after 1999 ex-
tracted using the Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) filter. As evident, there was
a large slump in aggregate investment, followed by a relatively smaller slump in
aggregate consumption. Similar conclusions are drawn if one looks at the raw
series.
Moreover, a casual observation of aggregated survey data on household’s fi-
nancial position and firm’s financial constraints reveals the extent to which
consumers and firms were affected.
15
Figure 3
The proportion of industrial firms claiming financial constraints in production
(FCP, quarterly) increased from 2% in 2008 to almost 15% before the end of
201512. The proportion of financially strained households (those that claim to
be getting indebted, (FBC, monthly)) increased from 5% in 2008 to 10% by the
end of 2016. Although more volatile, the share of firms claiming lack of financial
12BCS data can be downloaded from here.
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resources for investment (FCI, bi-annual) developed an upward trend from 2008,
with a sharp reversal after the end of 2016 where it reached 75%13.
These observations beg the question of what is the corresponding role of financial
frictions in explaining business cycle fluctuations in Spain, and what is their
interaction with aggregate shocks. I next exploit the theoretical analysis of the
previous sections by building a more elaborate quasi-structural model to provide
some empirical evidence to bear on this question.
I will proceed by gradually building the empirical model that is going to be used
in estimation. First, I will introduce the benchmark heterogeneous agent model
in its frictionless case where I will discuss the complications that arise when
we consider aggregation and how our approach is robust to alternative mecha-
nisms that could generate aggregate distortions. I will then add some additional
features such as variable capacity utilization, which generates additional cross
sectional moments, price markups and government policy.
5.1. The Benchmark Heterogeneous Agent Model. Since financial fric-
tions can manifest themselves through the household or the firm side, I consider
a two asset economy where households can save in capital as well as in bonds.
This is the minimal structure that is relevant to illustrate the empirical re-
strictions implied by financial constraints in general equilibrium and the cross
sectional moments that naturally arise when we approximate the HA model
around the representative agent allocation. A more elaborate model will in
principle generate more cross sectional moments that will have to be identified
from micro-surveys and linked to the business cycle model. The frictionless
model is presented first, and it is demonstrated that heterogeneity is not of first
order importance. However, this will not be true in an economy with frictions.
For brevity of notation, let Λtpiq signify the cross sectional distribution of agents
across state variables at time t14, and denote aggregate variables by capital let-
ters i.e. Xt ”
´
xi,tdΛtpiq. Similarly, denote by Λt,t`1piq the joint distribution
of individual states at pt, t`1q.
13Please see the Appendix for the exact wording of the question and data transformations.
14Λtpiq denotes the joint distribution function at time t, which is Ptpzi,t ď z,ki,t ď kq in this
section. This is equivalent to ppsi,t|Stq in the previous sections.
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5.1.1. The Frictionless Model. On the supply side, households with positive
capital holdings turn into effective entrepreneurs, who are akin to intermedi-
ate producers facing a downward sloping demand curve. Moreover, aggregate
output is a CES aggregate of intermediate goods.
Under monopolistic competition in the intermediate goods sector, the supply
side has a standard formulation. The final good firm chooses aggregate and
firm specific output pYt,yi,tq to maximize profits PtYt´
´
pi,tyi,tdΛtpiq subject to
CES aggregation, Y
´1

t “
´
y
´1

i,t dΛtpiq, leading to a downward sloping demand
curve for each firm i, yi,t “
´
pi,t
Pt
¯´
Yt.
The effective entrepreneur (ki,t ą 0) hires labor pldi,tq to minimize the cost of pro-
duction Wtldi,t subject to producing a certain level of output pzi,tki,tqαpldi,tq1´α ě
yi,t. This yields nominal labor costs equal to Wtldi,t “ p1´αqθiyi,t where θi is
the multiplier on the output constraint and p1´αqθi is the marginal cost.
Correspondingly, output at the optimal choice of labor is equal to yi,t“ zikiθ
1´α
α
i,t ζt
where ζt ”
´
1´α
Wt
¯ 1´α
α . Under the optimal price (constant markup over marginal
cost), pi,t “ ´1p1´αqθi,t, and therefore indirect profit is equal to pri,t “ yi,tpi,t .
Thus, aggregate labor costs are a fraction of nominal GDP:
WtLt “ ´1

PtYt
Households. Dynastic households decide over consumption, working hours and
total net worth to be carried over to the next period, pci,t, lsi,t,ai,t`1q. In turn,
ai,t is split between bonds wi,t earning a gross nominal interest rate Rt and
capital ki,t, earning a gross return Rki,t.
Individual investment decisions pιi,tq increase the availability of capital for next
period, up to a certain level of depreciation. Gross individual income is thus
equal to y¯i,t “Wtli,t`p1´ δqki,t`pri,t.
If ki,t “ 0, the household-worker receives only labor income. The household’s
decision problem is therefore as follows:
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maxtyi,t,ki,t`1,wi,t`1,ιi,t,ci,tu81
E0
8ÿ
t“0
βt
˜
c1´ωi,t ´1
1´ω ´
l1`ηi,t
1`η
¸
s.t. ai,t`1 “Rtwi,t` y¯i,t´Ptci,t
ai,t`1 “ Ptki,t`1`wi,t`1
y¯i,t “Wtli,t`p1´ δqPtki,t`pri,t
ki,t`1 “ p1´ δqki,t` ιi,t ě 0
Optimal behavior is then characterized by the following first order conditions:
c´ωi,t “ βEtc´ωi,t`1Rki,t`1`vi,t
c´ωi,t “ βEtc´ωi,t`1Π´1t`1Rt`1
lηi,t “
Wt
Pt
c´ωi,t
vi,tki,t`1 “ 0
which implies that vi,t “ βEtc´ωi,t`1
`
Π´1t`1Rt`1´Rki,t`1
˘
where vi,t is the multi-
plier on the non-negativity constraint on ki,t and Πt`1 “ Pt`1Pt is gross infla-
tion and Rki,t`1 “ p1´ δq` Bpri,t`1Bki,t`1 1Pt`1 , the individual return to capital invest-
ment.
If zi,t is highly autocorrelated, then bad productivity realizations can induce the
household to hit the non-negativity constraint where it is optimal to not hold
any capital stock pvi,t ą 0q. Note also that there is no assumed borrowing limit
(apart from the natural limit below which nobody would like to be) and thus
workers can effectively save to self insure against idiosyncratic risk.
5.1.2. The complete markets case. As in the KS example, growth in marginal
utility is equalized across agents. This implies that individual consumption is
proportional to aggregate consumption and the representative agent approxi-
mation becomes exact:
C´ωt “ βEtC´ωt`1Π´1t`1Rt`1
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which also implies that cross sectional variation becomes time invariant:ˆ
c´ωi,t Λtpiq “ C´ωt
ˆ
1` ωpω`1q2
ˆ
pci´1q2dΛtpiq`op1q
˙
Regarding the first order condition for capital, multiplying with predetermined
ki,t`1
Kt`1 , applying the same approximation to marginal utility and aggregating
using Λt`1piq yields that15:
C´ωt “ βEtC´ωt`1
ˆ
Rki,t`1
ki,t`1
Kt`1
dΛt`1piq “ βEtC´ωt`1
ˆ
p1´ δq` α

Yt`1
Kt`1
˙
When Ñ 1, this condition is isomorphic to the representative agent case where
aggregate production is Cobb- Douglas and α Yt`1Kt`1 is the marginal product of
capital. Furthermore, integrating firm revenue, and solving for aggregate output
yields:
Yt “
˜ˆ
ziki
ˆ
pi,t
Pt
˙ 1
α
dΛtpiq
¸α
L1´αt
A second order approximation yields Yt « pZtKtp1`pdtqqαL1´αt , where
pdt :“ 1
α
ˆ
zi,t
Zt
ki,t
Kt
ˆ
pi,t
Pt
´1
˙2
dΛtpiq
is a size and productivity weighted measure of price dispersion. Since in most
applications, Zt andKt are unobserved, unless price dispersion is time invariant,
recovered estimates of productivity shocks and the capital stock will also reflect
changes that are attributed to products that become relatively less or more
expensive, affecting output on the margin.
Finally, the inter-temporal condition for hours worked under the same approx-
imation for the marginal utility of consumption yields that aggregate labor
supply is pinned down by Lt “
`
Wt
Pt
˘ 1
η C
´ωη
t while in equilibrium
´1

Yt “
ˆ
Wt
Pt
˙1` 1
η
C
´ω
η
t
Denoting by X˜ the percentage deviations of Xt from the steady state, the
log-linearized conditions are identical to the representative agent case. Hetero-
geneity is thus negligible to first order:
15The same result holds if we apply the 2nd order approximation, integrate using the joint
distribution Ptpzi,t ď z,ki,t ď kq and set higher order moments to zero.
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´ωC˜t´EtR˜t`1`ωEtC˜t`1 “ 0
´ωC˜t´p1´βp1´ δqqEtR˜kt`1`ωEtC˜t`1 “ 0
yssY˜t´ cssC˜t´ issI˜t “ 0
K˜t`1´p1´ δqK˜t´ δI˜t “ 0
Y˜t´αZ˜t´αK˜t´p1´αqL˜t “ 0
R˜kt ´αZ˜t`p1´αqK˜t´p1´αqL˜t “ 0
Y˜t´ L˜t´ωC˜t´ηL˜t “ 0
5.1.3. When is heterogeneity important for aggregate fluctuations? This section
illustrates that in the presence of frictions, heterogeneity matters to first order.
More particularly, in addition to productivity, this section considers another
dimension of heterogeneity, that of investment efficiency. Both productivity
and investment efficiency shocks, zi,t and ηi,t respectively, can potentially affect
aggregate consumption and investment through different channels. Buera and
Moll (2015) studied these channels in isolation and concluded that heterogeneity
in productivity is the most likely form of heterogeneity as it leads to a fall in
total factor productivity (TFP), as is often observed in recessions.
Nevertheless, Gopinath, Kalemli-Özcan, Karabarbounis, and Villegas Sanchez
(2017) (GKKV henceforth) have argued that models of financial frictions that
link TFP to financial frictions predict an increase in TFP after a financial liber-
alization episode, which is inconsistent with the experience of Southern Europe,
including Spain.
The benchmark model is next modified to characterize the interaction of these
shocks and the borrowing constraint on net worth16.
16The way the borrowing constraint is specified does not affect the qualitative statements
made for the distortions ; ϕi,t could in principle depend on the size of the firm ki,t`1 as in
GKKV or the market value of its capital stock, ηi,t.
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The household problem becomes as follows:
maxtyi,t,ki,t`1,wi,t`1,ιi,tu81
E0
8ÿ
t“0
βt
˜
c1´ωi,t ´1
1´ω ´
l1`ηi,t
1`η
¸
s.t. ai,t`1 “Rtwi,t` y¯i,t´Ptci,t
ai,t`1 “ Ptηi,tki,t`1`wi,t`1
y¯i,t “Wtli,t`p1´ δqPtηi,tki,t`pri,t
ki,t`1 “ p1´ δqki,t` ιi,t
ηi,t
ki,t`1 ě 0
wi,t`1 ě´Ptϕi,tki,t`1
and the corresponding first order conditions with respect to capital and bonds
are:
ηi,tc
´ω
i,t “ βEtc´ωi,t`1Rki,t`1`vi,t`ϕi,tµi,t
c´ωi,t “ βEtc´ωi,t`1Π´1t`1Rt`1`µi,t
where µi,t is the multiplier on the occasionally binding borrowing constraint.
Combining the two conditions, µi,t when non zero is equal to
µi,t “ βEtc´ωi,t`1
˜
Rki,t`1´ηi,tΠ´1t`1Rt`1
ηi,t´ϕi,t
¸
` vi,t
ηi,t´ϕi,t
Since borrowing constraints can bind, households are not perfectly insured,
resulting in a non-negligible consumption variance.
5.1.4. Aggregation. Following the same approach as before, the approximate
aggregated first order condition for bonds is equal to:
ΞtC´ωt “ βEtC´ωt`1Ξt`1Π´1t`1Rt`1`
ˆ
µi,tdΛtpiq(7)
Correspondingly, the approximate aggregate investment Euler equation is
ΞtC´ωt “ βEtC´ωt`1Ξt`1
ˆ
Rki,t`1dΛtpiq`
ˆ
µki,tdΛtpiq(8)
where µki,t “ βEtc´ωi,t`1
ˆ
p1´ηi,t`ϕi,tqRki,t`1´Π´1t`1Rt`1
ηi,t´ϕi,t
˙
` vi,tηi,t´ϕi,t .
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If ηi,t “ ϕi,t “ 1, the aggregate distortions to the bond and capital Euler equa-
tions are identical, which implies that the aggregate expected returns are equal-
ized as in the standard complete markets case. If not, then the distortions will
be different, causing a disconnect in the aggregate returns, while distortions
will generally depend on aggregate shocks in a different way. An alternative
mechanism would imply a different dependence.This provides further justifica-
tion to our semi-structural approach that aims to measure the distortions and
how they depend on aggregate shocks as compared to imposing a particular
structure. This dependence will be empirically identified.
6. Full Model: A Richer Specification
Having analyzed the main implications of heterogeneity for macroeconomic ag-
gregates, and with a view to taking the model to the data, I enrich the model
on several dimensions.
I particular, household utility is assumed to also depend on external habits while
households decide also on capacity utilization, with the corresponding cost of
utilization being quadratic: ψ2 u
2
i,t. Capital holdings are thus also affected by an
intensive margin e.g. by how much capital is utilized.
Therefore, indirect profit returns become
Bpri,t
Bki,t “
Byi,t
Bkui,t
pi,t
t
ui,t´ ψ2 u
2
i,t
with utilized capital, kui,t “ ki,tui,t, and a time varying price markup, νpt :“
t
t´1 .
As for government policy, I introduce tax rates τ inct on wage income and τ
corp
t on
net profits respectively and lump sum taxes (net of transfers), ti. The household
problem is therefore almost identical to the previous section, with cash on hand
being the only difference:
maxtyi,t,ki,t`1,wi,t`1,ιi,t,ui,tu81
E0
8ÿ
t“0
βt
˜
pci,t´hCt´1q1´ω´1
1´ω ´
l1`ηi,t
1`η
¸
s.t. ai,t`1 “Rtwi,t` y¯i,t´Ptci,t
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ai,t`1 “ Ptηi,tki,t`1`wi,t`1
y¯i,t “ Wtli,tp1´ τ inct q`p1´ δqPtηi,tki,t`p1´ τ corpt q
ˆ
pri,t´Ptψ2 u
2
i,tki,t
˙
´ ti
ki,t`1 “ p1´ δqηi,tki,t` ιi,t
ηi,t
ki,t`1 ě 0
wi,t`1 ě´Ptϕi,tki,t`1
The optimality conditions also remain the same, with the only difference that
capital returns are now equal to
Rki,t “ p1´ δqηi,t`p1´ τ corpt q
˜
ui,t
Byi,t
Bkui,t
pi,t
Pt
νpt ´1
νpt
´ ψ2 u
2
i,t
¸
and optimal capital utilization pinned down by:
ui,t “ 1
ψ
˜
Byi,t
Bkui,t
pi,t
Pt
νpt ´1
νpt
¸
(9)
which implies that returns simplify to Rki,t “ p1´ δqηi,t`p1´ τtqψ2 u2i,t.
In addition, the intratemporal condition is distorted by the tax rate, that is,
disposable wage is now wtp1´ τ inct q.
6.1. Government Budget and Fiscal Policy. The government finances its
primary deficit either through domestic or foreign bond markers. Denoting by
Dt as the foreign portfolio, the government budget constraint is:
Dt`1`Wt`1
Pt
`Trt “Gt`RtWt
Pt
`R‹tDt
where R‹t is the interest rate on international borrowing which can in principle
be different than the monetary policy rate due to a country specific premium.
Moreover, it is assumed that the government implements a tax revenue target
rule, which responds to domestic and international real debt with a potentially
different weight:
Trt “ φf pDt`1´R‹tDtq`φd
ˆ
Wt`1
Pt
´RtWt
Pt
˙
` Tr,t
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while tax revenue can be generated using marginal income and corporate tax
rates and lump sum taxes (net of transfers):
Trt “ τ inct Wt
ˆ
li,tdΛtpiq` τ corpt
ˆ
pri,tdΛtpiq`T lump
“ τ inct WtLt` τ corpt Ytν
p
t ´1
νpt
`T lump
This endogenizes tax decisions, while it incorporates a more realistic component
of tax policy in the recent years, that of generating tax revenue to meet a fiscal
target.
Finally since the tax rate portfolio is undetermined, I assume that income tax
and corporate tax rates differ by a deterministic and an exogenous iid compo-
nent, broadly in line with empirical evidence (See the Appendix, Figure 6.).
Thus, I set τ inct “ τ1τ corpt dτ,t.
6.2. Ex Ante Real Rate. In this small open economy setup, the nominal rate
is largely determined exogenously pRt`1 “ R‹‹t q17. The ex- ante real rate will
therefore be equal to:
rt`1 “ Et 1` r
‹‹
t
1`pit`1 ´1(10)
While r‹‹t is mainly influenced by short term and long term foreign factors, ex-
pectations about future domestic inflation will in general depend on domestic
as well as foreign factors. Instead of hard-wiring the dependence of inflation
on these factors through a particular mechanism e.g. a New Keynesian Phillips
curve, I will allow for a flexible specification that will depend on a transitory
component that is unrelated to domestic fundamentals and the trend compo-
nent that summarizes the permanent effects of (domestic) aggregate shocks e.g.
productivity. The latter will explain the very persistent portion of variation
in inflation (and hence inflation expectations) that can also generate persistent
differences between the home country (i.e. Spain) and the rest of the monetary
union. To see this suppose that the EMU wide Taylor rule depends on some
form of efficient rate, EMU wide inflation expectations and a monetary policy
17Consistent with previous setup, the nominal interest applies to beginning of period bonds,
and is thus known from time t.
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shock. Then, the log-linearized form of 10 is as follows
r˜t`1 “ ρ˜‹‹t `Etp˜i‹‹t`1´Etp˜it`1` r‹‹,t
where the first three terms are more likely to depend on both short and long-
term structural factors.
6.3. Aggregation and Equilibrium. Before aggregating up the economy, it
is important to understand that the quasi-structural aggregate model that will
be taken to the data will not adhere to the specific mechanism that generates
the distortions to consumption and investment, in the same way in which we
did not adhere to the specific mechanism in the KS model.
6.3.1. Aggregate Investment. Adjusting the earlier aggregate Euler equations
for bonds and capital with external habits:
ΞtpCt´hCt´1q´ω “ βEtpCt`1´hCtq´ωΠ´1t`1Ξt,t`1Rt`1`µct
ΞtpCt´hCt´1q´ω “ βEtpCt`1´hCtq´ωΞt,t`1Rkt`1`µkt(11)
Since the real interest rate is exogenous due to the small open economy assump-
tion, aggregate consumption is already pinned down by the consumption Euler
equation, which implies that in the absence of ad-hoc investment adjustment
constraints pe.g: ηi,t “ ϕi,t “ 1q, investment is residually determined.
As pµct ,µkt q are not be pinned down by a specific mechanism, investment will not
adhere to a specific mechanism either. Instead of exploiting (11), distortions
to investment arising from e.g. efficiency losses in the investment sector can
be modeled directly through the capital accumulation equation18. To see this,
notice that if investment is distorted by an idiosyncratic shock, ki,t`1 “ p1´
δqki,t` ιi,tηi,t . Aggregating, we get that
Kt`1 “ p1´ δqKt` It´
ˆ
ιi,t
ηi,t´1
ηi,t
dΛtpiq “ p1´ δqKt` It´λI,t
18In the Appendix, I discuss how the model change if we also incorporated the capital Euler
equation and how distortions in investment λI,t depend on the aggregate value of capital.
This of course increases the number of parameters that have to be identified.
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where ιi,t ” ιpsi,t,Stq in equilibrium. As long as some agents face investment
costs e.g. ηi,t ą 1, investment is distorted downwards, and the distortion will de-
pend on aggregate shocks through ιi,t19. In equilibrium, investment will be dis-
torted by both the savings decisions of the households (summarized by V artpci,tq
and µt) and the distortion λI,t, which again, does not adhere to a specific mech-
anism.
6.3.2. Capital Utilization. Empirical measures of e.g. the capital utilization rate
and the marginal product of capital across firms are usually size-weighted. To
be consistent with these measurements, I re-express (9) in terms of the firm
capital stock:
u2i,t “ αψ
yi,t
ki,t
pi,t
Pt
νpt ´1
νpt
(12)
Moreover, to second order, the size weighted aggregate capital utilization is:
Ut ”
ˆ
ui,t
ki,t
Kt
dΛtpiq “
ˆ
1
ψ
νpt ´1
νpt
˙ 1
2
ˆ
α
Yt
Kt
˙ 1
2
ˆ
1´ 18V
k
t
˙
where V kt is the cross sectional dispersion of the real marginal product across
firms20:
V kt :“
ˆ
α
Yt
Kt
˙´2ˆ ˆByi,t
Bki,t
pi,t
Pt
´α Yt
Kt
˙2 ki,1
Kt
dΛtpiq
Dispersion in the marginal product of firms will lead to lower aggregate capital
utilization, and therefore losses in aggregate output. In turn, dispersion in the
marginal product of firms can be rationalized using alternative mechanisms,
such as the one presented above, where capital irreversibility (vi,t ą 0), individ-
ual investment inefficiency (ηi,tą 1) and firm specific collateral constraints pϕi,tq
can generate discrepancies between the return to capital and the real interest
19As noted by Buera and Moll (2015), several papers modeled financial frictions as a result
of heterogeneity in investment costs (opportunities), see e.g. Wang and Wen (2012); Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) .
20The aggregate return to capital is also pinned down as follows:
Rkt “
ˆ
Rki,t
ki,t
Kt
dΛiptq “ p1´ δq
ˆ
ηi,t
ki,t
Kt
dΛiptq`p1´ τtq
ˆ
ψ
2 α
Yt
Kt
νpt ´1
νpt
˙
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rate21. The paper will allow for a general dependence of this dispersion on all
shocks, including the real interest rate as in GKKV.
6.3.3. Aggregate Labor Supply and Wage Determination. Aggregating the in-
tratemporal condition, we get that aggregate labor supply is distorted by taxes
and household heterogeneity, Ξlabt :
Lst “
ˆ
Wtp1´ τ inct q
Pt
˙ 1
η
pCt´hCt´1q´ωη Ξlabt
where Ξlabt “ 1` ωpω`ηq2η2 pCt´hCt´1q´2V arpci,tq.
Correspondingly, following Blanchard and Gali (2007) real wage rigidity is par-
simoniously modeled as follows:
Wt
Pt
“
ˆ
Wt´1
Pt´1
˙ρw
pMRStq1´ρw
where MRSt :“ Lηt {pCt´hCt´1q´ω pΞlabt qηp1´ τ inct q. When ρwÑ 0, real wages
are competitively determined.
6.3.4. Macroeconomic Identity. Aggregating the private sector budget constraint
using Λtpiq and combining it with the government budget constraint, we get that
It`Ct`Gt`R‹tDt´Dt`1` ψ2
ˆ
u2i,tki,tdΛt,t “ Yt
Furthermore, using that international bonds have to be in zero net supply,
Dfort `Dt “ 0
for all t. Defining net foreign lending as NFLt :“Dfort`1´R‹tDfort , the macroe-
conomic identity becomes as follows:
It`Ct`Gt`NFLt` 12α
νpt ´1
νpt
Yt “ Yt
21This is similar to Gopinath, Kalemli-Özcan, Karabarbounis, and Villegas Sanchez (2017)
who assume instead capital adjustment costs and size dependent borrowing constraints. The
latter was shown to be important for capital misallocation with the decline of the real interest
rate faced by the European South.
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6.4. Informing µct and λI,t. As in the KS model, we can proceed with estima-
tion of the aggregate model above by using the smallest set of macroeconomic
data and cross-sectional moments, and we can in principle identify how µct and
λI,t interact with aggregate shocks. Nevertheless, one can further decompose
these two distortions into an intensive and an extensive margin. That is, we can
decompose these distortions into the proportion of households and firms whose
behavior is distorted and by how much they adjust, on average:
µct ” Etpµi,t|µi,t ‰ 0qPtpµi,t ‰ 0q
λI,t ” EtpλI,i,t|λI,i,t ‰ 0qPtpλI,i,t ‰ 0q
The extensive margin captures how aggregate shocks push a measure of con-
sumers and firms against their constraints while the intensive margin captures
by how much they distort their decisions on average and how this depends on
aggregate shocks. To see how these statistics relate to interesting quantities,
suppose that we are interested in computing the consumption response to fiscal
stimulus, financed by lump sum taxes (negative transfers), Gt“
´
tidΛiptq.
Abstracting from labor supply (li,t “ 1), setting marginal tax rates equal to
zero and assuming no cost of capital capital utilization (ψ “ 0) and perfect
competition, cash on hand is equal to yi,t “Wt´ ti. For the sake of illustra-
tion, assuming that the resulting density of the cross sectional distribution of
consumption22 is exponential, ftpiq “ ρe´ρci,t (ρ is the rate parameter, where
Ct “ 1ρ ,V arpci,tq “ 1ρ2 ), the response of aggregate consumption to an increase in
government purchases is equal to:
dCt
dGt
“
ˆ
dci,t
dGt
dΛiptq`
ˆ
ci,t
dpdΛtpiqq
dGt
which can be analyzed as followsˆ
dci,t
dyi,t
dyi,t
dGt
dΛtpiq`
ˆ
ci,t
dlnpfiptqq
dGt
dΛtpiq
“ dWt
dGt
ˆ
dci,t
dyi,t
dΛtpiq` 12ρ
dlnpV artpci,tqq
dGt
´
ˆ
ci,t
Ct
dci,t
dGt
dΛtpiq
22Consumption is a function of the state variables, thus the distribution of consumption is a
tranformation of the joint distribution of the underlying states.
29
u
dWt
dGt
ˆ
dci,t
dyi,t
dΛtpiq` 12ρ
dlnpV artpci,tqq
dGt
where we ignore the last higher order term in the last equation. Distributional
effects of changes in government spending are captured by changes in the vari-
ance, just as in our case. Moreover, the average adjustment is determined by
the general equilibrium response of the wage rate and the average marginal
propensity to consume (MPC). The latter is the average of the MPC of those
agents who behave as permanent income consumers (low MPC) e.g. those who
are well insured or do not face any kind of constraint, and those agents with
high MPC e.g. the constrained (poor or otherwise).
The representative agent point of approximation captures permanent income
type of behavior while the aggregate response of the constrained is:ˆ
µi,t‰0
dci,t
dyi,t
dΛtpiq “
ˆ
dci,t
dyi,t
ft pi : µi,t ‰ 0qdilooooooooooooomooooooooooooon
Intensive
ˆ
µi,t‰0
ftpiqdiloooooomoooooon
Extensive
These are two aggregate variables that depend on aggregate states and this
dependence could be potentially separately identified, if one can measure either
of them at business cycle frequencies. This paper’s approach identifies the
corresponding log-linear relation between the margins of adjustment and the
shocks23. Moreover, had we allowed for labor choice in this example, we would
have to identify how the covariance of the marginal propensity to consume and
the marginal propensity to work vary with aggregate shocks.
7. Taking the model to the data
Recall that the representation result in Proposition (1) in Section 4 implies that
there is a one to one mapping from distortions in the Euler equation to distor-
tions in the law of motion, and these distortions will depend on the endogenous
and exogenous aggregate states. The Euler equation is therefore augmented
23One could of course find other ways or other moments to meaningfully inform these distor-
tions. Direct estimates of the marginal propensities to consume of household groups at the
business cycle frequency could also be employed, but this entails its own measurement issues,
as well as the difficulty of obtaining reliable measures at this frequency.
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with these distortions. For maximal generality, the variance of the consumption
shares is allowed to depend on all shocks and the capital stock24. Solving the
model using conventional techniques allows us to trace the effect of both the
distortions and cross sectional moments (heterogeneity) to all macroeconomic
variables. The log-linearized estimable model is therefore as follows, where Λint
and Λext denote the coefficients loading on the states and correspond to the
elasticities of the intensive and extensive margins to aggregate shocks for both
consumption and investment:
C˜t “ hC˜t´1`βRss
ˆ
EtpC˜t`1´hC˜tq´ 1´h
ω
Et
`
R˜t`1`pΞ˜t`1´ Ξ˜tq
˘˙
´p1´βRssq1´h
ω
µc,t
µc,t “ Λc1intS˜ct ` B˜cont ” Λc1intS˜ct `Λc1extS˜t
W˜t “ ρwW˜t´1`p1´ρwq
ˆ
ω
1´h
`
C˜t´hC˜t´1
˘`ηL˜t` τ incss1´ τ incss T˜ inct ´ Ξ˜labt
˙
W˜t “ Y˜t´ L˜t´ ν˜pt
K˜t`1 “ p1´ δqK˜t`pδ´λI,ssqI˜t`λI,ssλI,t
λI,t “ ΛI 1intS˜t` B˜invt
B˜invt “ ΛI 1extS˜t
K˜ut “ K˜t´1` Uˆt “ K˜t´1` 12
ˆ
r˜kt ` 1vpss´1 ν˜
p
t
˙
` v
k
ss
vkss´8 V˜
k
t
Y˜t “ αZ˜t`αK˜ut `p1´αqL˜t
r˜kt “ αZ˜t´p1´αqK˜t`p1´αqL˜t
yssY˜t “
ˆ
1´ α2
vpss´1
vpss
˙´1ˆ
cssC˜t` issI˜t`gssG˜t`nflssČNFLt` α2 yssvpss ν˜pt
˙
rV kt “ vkpB˜invt `vkzZ˜t`vkforČNFLt`vkkK˜t`vkgG˜t`vkrR˜t`vkτ T˜ lumpt(13)
R˜t “ ρRR˜t´1` R,t
TrssT˜ rt “ τ incss WssLsspT˜ inct `W˜t` L˜tq` τ corpss PrsspP˜ rt` T˜ corpt q` T˜ lumpt
24Recall that from Section 3, V artpci,t`1q is computed under ppsi,t`1|St`1,Stqdsi,t`1 and
it therefore depends potentially on all aggregate states. Observing measures of consumption
variance over time, permits identification of this channel without resorting to a specific model.
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“ 11`φd
´
φdgssG˜t`pφd´φf qnflssČNFLt` Tr,t¯
τ˜ inct “ τ˜ corpt ` T,t
P˜ rt “ Y˜t` 1
νpss´1 ν˜
p
trV ct “ vcpB˜cont `vczZ˜t`vcforČNFLt`vckK˜t`vcgG˜t`vcrR˜t`vcτ T˜ lump(14)
Ξ˜t “ ωp1`ωqV
c
ss
2p1´hq2`ωp1`ωqV css
ˆrV ct ´ 2h1´hpC˜t´ C˜t´1q
˙
Ξ˜labt “ ωpη`ωqV
c
ss
2η2p1´hq2`ωpη`ωqV css
ˆrV ct ´ 2h1´hpC˜t´ C˜t´1q
˙
where S˜t“ pZ˜t, ĆNFLt, K˜t´1, G˜t, R˜t, T˜ lumpq are the aggregate states that are con-
sidered to be the potential drivers of financial frictions.
When accounting for intensive distortions, I also control for heterogeneity within
the intensive margin to separately identify possible dependence on aggregate
shocks that feeds through heterogeneity in individual consumption and corpo-
rate income. I thus let S˜ct “ pS˜t, rV ct , rV kt q.
Besides aggregate states, to improve the identification of the variance rV ct when
it is latent, the latter is explicitly linked to the proportion of constrained agents
B˜cont using the law of total variance:
V ct “ Bcont
˜
Et
«ˆ
ci,t
Ct
˙2
| λi,t ą 0
ff
´Et
«ˆ
ci,t
Ct
˙2
| λi,t “ 0
ff¸
`Et
«ˆ
ci,t
Ct
˙2
| λi,t “ 0
ff
´1(15)
The first component is the difference between the second moments of constrained
and unconstrained agents while the second component is a measure of varia-
tion across unconstrained agents. If nobody is constrained, then there is no
"between" variation. Log-linearizing this expression leads to (14), where it is
recognized that the "between" variation and the variance of the unconstrained
cannot be separately identified but can be linked to all the shocks.
Finally, for „Np0,diagpΣqq, the exogenous variables evolve as follows :
Z˜t “ ρzZ˜t´1` Z,t
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ĆNFLt “ ρnfl ĆNFLt´1` NFL,t
G˜t “ ρGg˜t´1` G,t` cgz,t
R˜t “ ρrR˜t´1` R,t
T˜ lumpt “ ρτ T˜ lumpt´1 ` T lump,t
vpt “ ρvpvpt´1` vp,t`ρvp,gG,t`ρvp,rvpt´1
Due to the small open economy assumption, the real interest rate is taken as
exogenous. Moreover, despite that there are no micro-foundations, the inclu-
sion of a time varying price markup absorbs any wage variation that cannot be
explained by average productivity, including wage rigidities, and captures the
effects of policy shocks on markups without resorting to a particular mechanism
of price rigidity. This is important for avoiding misspecification in the construc-
tion of counterfactuals25 as well as avoiding taking a stance on how interest rate
and fiscal policy shocks affect firm profitability26.
7.1. Data, Trends and Measurements. The model is estimated using time
series data from 1999Q1 to 2018Q1 on: aggregate (durable and non-durable)
consumption, hours, gross capital formation, capacity utilization, government
spending, the ex-post real EONIA rate, income and corporate tax rates, tax
revenues as % of nominal GDP, the estimates of GKKS for the dispersion of
the marginal product of capital across Spanish firms27, two measures of cross
sectional dispersion of consumption obtained from the Survey of Household
Finances and the Household Budget survey respectively and two measures on
financially constrained consumers and firms, pBcont ,Binvt q respectively. While
FCI can be considered as a proxy for the proportion of financially constrained
25In the Appendix I plot standardized estimates of the (inverse) markup: It does not explain
much of the wage during the crisis, while they broadly co-move before 2007. Correlation s
statistically insignificant ((-0.34, 0.13)).
26The benchmark New Keynesian model has been criticized for its implications regarding the
cyclicality of the markup when prices are rigid, see e.g. (Ramey, 2019b; Broer, Harbo Hansen,
Krusell, and Öberg, 2019) and references therein.
27I thank Loukas Karabarbounis for providing me with this measure.
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firms28, the proportion of borrowing constrained consumers is a latent variable
that is harder to measure.
The FBC measure plotted in Figure 3 is the proportion of households that
responded that they are "running into debt" in the Business and Consumer
Survey (BCS) of the European Commission29. This is an an upper bound to
the true fraction of households that are likely to face borrowing constraints
within the quarter, as some of those already into or getting into debt may (have
been) be denied a loan application.
As in Tryphonides (2020), I combine FBC with a direct measure computed from
the Survey of Household Finances (SHF). This measure asks households whether
they have been denied a loan application during this period30. In fact, such
questions also ask for the reason for which these households have been rejected,
and these reasons vary depending on individual characteristics, employment,
guarantees, changes in the institution’s credit policy, excessive debt etcetera.
Yet, this measure is available every three years.
To infer the true proportion of constrained households for the periods in which
it is not observed, so all periods between the triennial measure from SHF, I em-
ploy a mixed frequency model, where the quarterly observations on consumers
running into debt are linked to the triennial exact measure. Letting Bcont be
the exact measure and Πt the proportion of consumers running into debt, then
Bcont “ ζtΠt where ζt P p0,1q, as the agents that hit the minimum level of permis-
sible debt are a fraction of the total measure of indebted households. As shown
in the appendix, this serves as a measurement equation in a mixed frequency
state space model. I plot the extracted measure in Figure 10.
Furthermore, excluding durables from aggregate consumption does not seem a
reasonable thing to do since liquidity constraints are more binding in the case of
28In the model borrowing constraints affect firms primarily through investment, and this is in
accordance with the evidence presented in Figure 3. I thus employ the FCI series as a proxy
and not FCP. Please consult the Appendix for the exact wording and transformations.
29This comprises of monthly data, which can be downloaded from here.
30Accounting for consumers that have not applied for loans because they expect to be rejected
(also coined as "discouraged borrowers" in Cox and Jappelli (1993) ) or consumers that were
granted a fraction of the requested loan does not affect the estimate of this proportion.
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large purchases e.g. automobiles. As far as housing is concerned, consumption
measures include imputed rents, which can be thought as the service value of
housing and not the housing stock per se.
Consistent with the choice of observable, housing choice is not separately mod-
eled31. Moreover, to compute the variance of consumption in the two surveys
durable consumption is included as well. More details on the exact computation
are in the Appendix.
7.1.1. Measurement Equations for Cross Sectional Variances. Cross section quan-
titative surveys are available on an annual basis and it is assumed that reported
annual consumption is the sum of quarterly consumption (up to measurement
error). Also, consistent with the partial equilibrium example in Tryphonides
(2020), the reduced form process for consumption under liquidity constraints is
an autoregressive process. Therefore, denoting by ρc the persistence component
of the individual consumption share cˆi,t :“ ci,tCt :
V arpcˆanni,t q “ V arpcˆQ4i,t q`p1`2ρcqV arpcˆQ3i,t q`
`p1`2ρcp1`ρcqqV arpcˆQ2i,t q``p1`2ρcp1`ρc`ρ2cqqV arpcˆQ1i,t q
The same measurement equation is applied to the variance of the marginal
product of firms, where mpki,t is also assumed to be an autoregressive process
of order one with coefficient ρmpk.
7.1.2. Trends. The presence of frictions, aggregate shocks and a slowly evolving
distribution of consumers and firms makes it difficult to argue that the model
does not have implications for frequencies lower than the typical business cy-
cle frequency. A casual inspection of the macroeconomic and cross sectional
moment time series verifies this possibility. At the same time, the model is
approximated around a non-stochastic steady state, implying that when ap-
propriately scaled, all observables should have a meaningful long run average
or in other words, they should fluctuate around a trend that possibly depends
31As an approximation, accumulating capital stock that produces a level of income after
paying a cost of labor is equivalent to accumulating housing stock that, with a certain level
of labor input such as housework produces a service flow that enters consumption.
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on the permanent component of shocks. Therefore, removing variation in the
observables without taking into account their joint determination is likely to
bias our results. Following Canova (2014), I embed the model in a more general
measurement system akin to a local level model, where I allow for a common
permanent component to consumption and its dispersion, investment, wages
and government spending. More particularly, in the notation of Section 4, the
solution pP ‹pθq,Q‹pθqq of the model is embedded to a more general system
where the above mentioned observables are modelled as a sum of a permanent
trend and a non-permanent component, where the permanent component is a
random walk and Xnpt is the law of motion of the model:
Xobst “ SΥΥt`SXXnpt
Υt “ Υt´1` pt
Xnpt “ P ‹pθqXnpt´1`Q‹pθqnpt
where SΥ and SX are the linking functions from measurements to states32.
Furthermore, I allow for 5% of the variance of all aggregates is measurement
error.
7.1.3. Prior distributions and Estimation. I assume largely uninformative pri-
ors, which are presented in Table 3 in the Appendix. A 2-block RW-MCMC
is used to obtain posterior parameter draws, while ΘCS5% is constructed using
(projections) of the 95% joint confidence set obtained using quantiles from the
posterior draws of the objective function as in Chen, Christensen, and Tamer
(2018) in order to take into account potential failures of point identification.
The confidence sets are reported in Table 1.
7.2. Results. Parameter estimates yield several insights both for the effects
of aggregate shocks on the corresponding margins. Productivity, government
spending and foreign lending shocks are quite persistent while tax shocks are
less persistent but with higher conditional volatility than the rest of the shocks.
Productivity shocks have a positive effect on government spending, suggesting
that spending is pro-cyclical. Moreover, the weight in the tax revenue target
32For more details on SΥ and SX please see the Appendix.
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rule on domestic debt is higher than foreign debt, probably driven by the in-
creased holdings of government debt by domestic banks (2008-2012) and the
subsequence increase in holdings by the Bank of Spain, as a result of the Pub-
lic Sector Purchase Programme and its conditionalities. Regarding markups,
what is interesting is that there is no posterior evidence for the cyclicality with
respect to either productivity shocks or real interest rate shocks, while there
is evidence that the markups are countercyclical with respect to government
spending.
7.2.1. Conditional Consumption Behavior. In terms of relative magnitudes, ex-
ogenous shocks in the ex-ante real rate shocks are the most important drivers
of the extensive margin in consumption. An increase in the real rate leads to a
« 19% increase in the proportion of the borrowing constrained. While a higher
interest rate encourages savings, those households that are still willing to borrow
cannot service the higher cost of borrowing. The effect on the intensive margin
is also positive but smaller (« 3.5%). A higher rate increases the returns to
bond holders but it also increases the debt interest payments on existing debt.
A second round effect arises as consumption dispersion increases by « 1.8% due
to the direct interest rate effect, an expected outcome given the heterogeneity
of debt levels and the differential effects on savers versus borrowers. Moreover,
the initial rise in the proportion of the borrowing constrained leads to a small
dampening effect on consumption dispersion. Inspecting (15), the negative co-
efficient vcp suggests that the dispersion in consumption by the unconstrained
consumers wealky dominates that of the constrained in the steady state.
On the other hand, productivity shocks decrease the share of borrowing con-
strained by « 2.5% as they increase employment and wages, while they increase
the distortion to the intensive margin by roughly the same percentage. Con-
sumption dispersion falls, which leads to a fall in aggregate labour supply. A
second round dampening effect arises as the decrease in the proportion of con-
strained consumers increases consumption dispersion. Government spending
shocks seem to affect the consumption margins differently. They contribute to
a « 1.5% increase in the share of the borrowing constrained and a « 6.5% on the
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Table 1. Robust Confidence Set for Θ
Θ q5% q95% Θ q5% q95% Θ q5% q95%
Preferences Cons. Heterogeneity
ω 3.885 3.999 η 6.418 7.226 V css 0.01371 0.0166
β 0.9819 0.9839 h 0.2138 0.4102 vcp -0.2204 -0.1037
Exogenous Shocks Debt Policy vcz -3.802 -2.244
ρz 0.863 0.9446 φd 24.660 27.950 vcg 0.1456 0.9943
ρg 0.9277 0.9701 φf 7.043 9.695 vcnfl -2.789 -2.319
ρnfl 0.9606 0.9772 σTr 0.0658 0.1122 vck 1.605 2.570
ρr,1 0.8130 0.9240 Price Dispersion vcr 1.374 2.344
ρr,2 0.0707 0.1141 pdss 0.0741 0.8810 vcτ -0.3590 0.5595
ρτ 0.6116 0.8689 Rigidity and Markup vc,id 1.376 2.007
cgz 0.3047 0.652 ρpv 0.9452 0.9626 Firm Heterogeneity
σz 0.0520 0.0682 σvp 0.0398 0.0475 vip -11.36 -9.582
σg 0.0401 0.0485 ρvp,g -0.7430 -0.1990 viz 4.118 4.431
σnfl 0.0669 0.0970 ρvp,m -1.753 0.4145 vig -2.344 -0.6431
σr 0.0073 0.0090 ρvp,z -0.1334 0.1893 vinfl 1.341 5.594
στ 0.3427 0.6457 ρw 0.7385 0.8338 vik -0.6559 0.9013
Constrained Consumers Constrained Inv. Firms viτ -6.451 -4.367
λc,extz -2.881 -1.683 λI,extz -1.056 -0.2335 vir -2.778 -2.264
λc,extg 0.5816 2.53 λI,extg 1.901 2.332 vi,id 0.0670 0.2905
λc,extnfl 0.0747 0.9848 λ
I,ext
nfl -1.0590 -0.7936
λc,extk 5.594 6.335 λ
I,ext
k 1.027 2.400 Measurement-Dispersion
λc,extτ 0.1506 0.327 λI,extτ -0.6784 -0.4121 ρmpk -0.999 -0.9625
λc,extr 17.69 20.07 λI,extr 11.2 16.15 ρc -0.999 -0.9672
λcz 1.298 3.005 λIz -1.622 -1.282
λcg 5.123 8.139 λIg -3.292 -3.107
λcnfl 7.838 9.971 λInfl 0.6974 2.85
λck -6.596 -4.704 λIk -0.3325 0.6473
λcτ -2.993 1.731 λIτ -0.1325 1.18
λcr 2.713 4.727 λIr -2.462 -1.771
λc
V k
0.4435 0.6007 λI,ss -0.0020 -0.0003
λcV c 6.233 6.738
intensive margin. Both can have a negative impact on aggregate consumption.
The increase in government spending increases dispersion as well, while the di-
rect effect is also dampened by the increase in the extensive margin. Lump sum
38
tax shocks do not seem to contribute much in the consumption margins, ap-
part from a slight increase in the proportion of the borrowing constrained. Net
foreign demand shocks, or negative foreign borrowing shocks, affect both the
intensive and the extensive margin of the borrowing constrained. This suggests
that exogenous constraints to international borrowing also exert distortions to
domestic consumption.
7.2.2. Conditional Investment Behavior. On the investment side, shocks to the
ex-ante real interest rate are also (conditionally ) important for the behavior
of the extensive margin as a 1% increase in the rate increases the proportion
of investment inefficient firms by « 13.5%. An increase in the cost of funding
necessarily causes certain firms to become investment constrained, while on
average, the effect on the intensive margin is negative. On the other hand,
productivity shocks seem to lower both the extensive and the intensive margin
of the distortion. Foreign demand shocks lower the extensive margin while they
increase the intensive margin of adjustment.
In general, high dispersion in the marginal product of capital (mpki) leads to
lower utilization of the existing capital stock, leading to output - and there-
fore welfare - losses. Moreover, there is evidence that dispersion is very much
dominated by that of the currently unconstrained firms pvip ă 0q. What this
suggests is that to some extent, it is the existence of e.g. capital adjustment
costs, which are also a source of heterogeneity in the marginal product of cap-
ital that can explain the latter rather than occasionally binding constraints.
Productivity shocks increase dispersion both directly and indirectly through in-
creases in B˜invt . Same holds for government spending shocks, which decrease
dispersion both ways, suggesting that spending might alleviate constraints and
inefficiencies. This is also consistent with the fact that while government spend-
ing seems to crowd out investment by increasing the proportion of firms that
face an increasing cost of funding, for those that have been constrained be-
fore the spending shock, it may lower the degree by which they distort their
investment choice.
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In terms of unconditional explanatory behavior, the variance decomposition in
Table 2 illustrates that shocks to government spending and net foreign borrow-
ing seem to explain around 30´40% of the variance of the endogenous variables
(with the exception of tax revenues, where foreign lending shocks explain 58%),
while productivity shocks explain around 10´15% of all variables except con-
sumption, where they explain a share of 24%. So while the ex-ante reall rate
can explain a lot of the conditional variation, this is not true in an uncondi-
tional sense. This can be explained by the relatively lower variance of the shock
across the sample. Posterior evidence also points towards less idiosyncratic risk
in investment than consumption.
Table 2. Uconditional Variance Decomposition, % (at mode of Θ)
Z,t G,t NFL,t R,t τ,t T,t vp,t Tr,t Vc,t VI ,t
C 23.9 34.5 26.8 2.5 0.1 0.9 11.4 0.0 0.1 0.0
Y 15.6 38.3 30.1 1.9 0.1 1.1 12.9 0.0 0.1 0.00
I 15.4 38.4 30.1 1.9 0.1 1.1 13.0 0.0 0.1 0.00
H 15.2 36.6 28.9 1.9 0.1 2.3 15.0 0.0 0.1 0.00
W 15.4 37.4 28.3 2.1 0.1 0.9 16.0 0.0 0.1 0.00
vp 0.0 24.8 - 2.3 - - 72.9 - - -
Tr 11.7 29.6 58.2 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.4 0.0 0.0
τ inc 15.2 37.4 29.3 1.9 0.1 2.8 13.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
τ corp 14.7 36.3 28.4 1.9 0.1 5.7 12.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
V c 12.1 26.9 27.9 1.4 0.1 0.7 9.1 0 22.0 0.0
V k 15.1 38.2 30.3 2.6 0.1 1.0 12.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bcon 15.4 38.4 30.2 2.1 0.1 1.0 13.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Binv 15.0 37.8 29.7 2.6 1.4 1.0 13.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
While impulse responses to all shocks could be potentially interesting, I next
focus on the government spending multiplier, a long standing empirical and
theoretical question33. Although producing credible evidence on these effects
is not void of challenges, several papers have tried to reconcile the identified
effects from SVAR/EVAR models using modified versions of the neoclassical or
the New-Keynesian model. On the consumption side, a notable example is Galí,
López-Salido, and Vallés (2007) who argue that the standard New-Keynesian
model can produce a positive effect of government purchases on consumption
33See Ramey (2016) for a summary of estimated government multipliers in the literature.
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only if we account for rule of thumb consumers and price rigidities. Furthermore,
on measuring the effects of fiscal policy in recessions, Parker (2011) reiterates
the importance of controlling for the "dependence of the effects of a policy on
the states of different agents, which is a key component of the dependence of
the general-equilibrium effects of fiscal policy on the state of the economy". The
paper’s methodology is well suited for this purpose.
Moreover, despite that the model does not specify a specific mechanism through
which markups respond to changes in government spending, it accommodates
for such effects. Since markups are identified through the aggregate intertem-
poral labor supply condition, we cannot distinguish between the conditional
cyclicality of wage and price markups. Nevertheless, we can compute by how
much does the response to government spending shocks changes when the con-
tribution of markups is shut down.
Recall that the period under consideration corresponds to both years during
which there was a surge in sub-national government spending e.g. 1999-2007
(Martí and Pérez, 2016), while later years correspond to the face of fiscal adjust-
ment during the crisis after 2007. The model employed in this paper features
both deficit financing as well as distortionary and non-distortionary taxation,
which can capture reasonably well the macro and distributional data, as well
as the characteristics of fiscal policy during the period34. Fiscal multipliers
are computed in cumulative, present value form as in e.g Mountford and Uh-
lig (2009), The government spending multiplier is estimated to be between 0.7
and 1.7, supporting therefore values well above one on impact, while negative
values receive positive posterior probability after two years. These estimates
correspond to the upper end of multipliers in the literature, mostly with US
data, as surveyed in Ramey (2019a).
In the next set of results I investigate several counterfactuals regarding the gov-
ernment spending fiscal multiplier. In particular, Figure 4 presents what would
the multiplier be in a world in which there are no fluctuations in borrowing con-
strained consumers, consumption dispersion and investment constrained firms.
This is an unconditional exercise, in the sense that the whole mechanism is
34See Figure 12 for an assessment of the fit of the model.
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shut down rather than just the component of the mechanism that depends on
fiscal policy. The extensive margin seems to affect the multiplier in the longer
term but not in a quantitatively significant way, pushing towards higher values.
In the absence of investment constrained firms as well as heterogeneity in con-
sumption, the lower bound to the multiplier is significantly reduced, supporting
values as low as 0.55 on impact, as well as crossing zero as early as in 1.5 years.
On the contrary, in longer horizons, shutting down these channels implies higher
fiscal multipliers.
Figure 4. 90% Confidence Sets.
In order to understand better the implications of the model, I next study the
importance of different channels for the mutiplier by shutting down the compo-
nents of different channels that depend on the government spending shock.
Compared to the total response, the components that seem to contribute most
to the final response of output by reacting to the fiscal policy shock are the
markups, the intensive margin of constrained consumers, consumption and mar-
ginal revenue product dispersion, as well as the extensive margin of investment
constrained firms. Markups have a positive contribution to the multiplier. Since
they are estimated to be countercyclical conditional on government expenditure,
an exogenous shock to the latter lowers firms profits which induces an increase
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in output and employment - a standard mechanism in the New Keynesian lit-
erature.
In the absence of consumption share heterogeneity as well as the intensive mar-
gin of adjustment of constrained consumers, the response of output is much
lower, while it reaches the negative territory after « 1.5 quarters. On the con-
trary, dispersion in the marginal revenue product of firms, a sign of inefficiency,
suppresses the effect of a fiscal expansion on output at all periods. In the
absence of the extensive margin of investment constrained firms, the response
would much higher while positive dispersion in the marginal revenue product
puts downward pressure to the multiplier across all periods.
Figure 5. Counterfactuals at Posterior Mode for Θ
8. Conclusion
This paper has shown that a heterogeneous agent model can be approximated
around the complete markets allocation and this induces an equilibrium law of
motion where higher order moments can be explicitly accounted for. The ap-
proximation used lends itself to conventional likelihood based methods, useful
for linking the model to a variety of aggregated micro and macro data over the
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business cycle. The method was employed to study extensively the effects of
financial frictions in the Spanish economy and how different margins depend
on aggregate shocks. The semi-structural model was informed using aggregated
quantitative and qualitative data which permit the identification of this depen-
dence. Empirical results show that heterogeneity, whether it is cross sectional
dispersion or differential response between constrained and unconstrained agents
are important empirical determinants of the fiscal multiplier.
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9. Appendix (For Online Publication)
9.1. Derivations with external Habits in Consumption. With external
habit formation, the utility of the household becomes as follows:
upci,t, li,t,Ctq :“
˜
pci,t´hCt´1q1´ω´1
1´ω ´
l1`ηi,t
1`η
¸
and the corresponding Euler equations are:
ηi,t pci,t´hCt´1q´ω “ βEt pci,t`1´hCtq´ωRki,t`1`vi,t`ϕi,tµi,t
pci,t´hCt´1q´ω “ βEt pci,t`1´hCtq´ωΠ´1t`1Rt`1`µi,t
Expanding individual consumption around aggregate consumption:ˆ
pci,t`1´hCtq´ω dΛtpiq
u pCt`1´hCtq´ω
ˆ
1` ωpω`1q2 pCt´hCt´1q
´2V artpci,tq
˙
:“ pCt`1´hCtq´ωΞtphq
In particular, the bond Euler equation becomes:
pCt´hCt´1q´ωΞtphq “ βEt pCt`1´hCtq´ωΞt`1phqΠ´1t`1Rt`1`
ˆ
µi,tdΛtpiq
Correspondingly, the aggregate intratemporal condition becomes:ˆ
li,tdΛtpiq “ w
1
η
t pci,t´hCt´1q´
ω
η
“ w
1
η
t pCt´hCt´1q´
ω
η
ˆ
1` ωpω`ηq2η2 pCt´hCt´1q
´2V artpci,tq
˙
“ w
1
η
t pCt´hCt´1q´
ω
η Ξlabt
The corresponding log-linearized versions for heterogeneity are:
Ξ˜t “ ωp1`ωqV arc,ss2p1´hq2`ωp1`ωqV arc,ss
ˆĄV artˆci,t
Ct
˙
´ 2h1´hpC˜t´ C˜t´1q
˙
and
Ξ˜labt “ ωpη`ωqV arc,ss2η2p1´hq2`ωpη`ωqV arc,ss
ˆĄV artˆci,t
Ct
˙
´ 2h1´hpC˜t´ C˜t´1q
˙
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9.2. Priors.
Table 3. Priors for ΘFI and Calibration
Θ Prior Θ Prior
ω Γp3,1q η Γp3,1q
β Up0.98,1q h Betap1.2,1.2q
ρz Up´1,1q φd Up´60,60q
ρg Up´1,1q φf Up´60,60q
ρnfl Up´1,1q σTr InvGammp0,5q
ρτ Up´1,1q ρmpk Up´1,1q
cgz Np0,5q ρc Up´1,1q
ρvp,pg,mq Np0,5q ρvp,z Np0,5q
σz InvGammp0,5q ρvr Up´60,60q
σg InvGammp0,5q σV k InvGammp0,5q
σnfl InvGammp0,5q pdss Np0,5q
στ InvGammp0,5q ρpv Up´1,1q
λ and λext Np0,5q σvp InvGammp0,5q
V css InvGammp0,5q vc Np0,5q
α 0.36 δ 0.0175
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9.3. Survey Data and Transformations. The question asked to industrial
firms in the BCS survey is under the heading "Factors affecting investment
in t and t` 1" and is about the availability of financial resources and their
(opportunity) cost, worded as follows : "This heading covers the availability of
resources for investment (and their cost) together with the return on investment
and the lack of opportunities for the company to use its resources more profitably
than by investment (notably by purely financial operations)". This akin to an
investment efficiency shock in the reference model which makes an investment
costly e.g. ηi,t ą 1.
Answers to this question are in the form of a balanced statistic over 5 categorical
answers, from "very limiting" to "very stimulating". We thus need to transform
the series to compute the actual proportion of firms that face this inefficiency.
Each answer is chosen by a proportion pi of firms and the balance statistic B “
p5`0.5p4´p2`0.5p1 corresponds to judging whether there is more mass above
or below the median x, medpxq and truncating the distribution on both ends by
the same proportion to avoid extremes. Taking the truncated distribution as
the true distribution, then the balance statistic is B ” Ppx ąmedpxqq`Ppx ă
medpxqq which implies that Ppx ąmedpxqq “ 1`B2 . This measure is at annual
frequency and is treated as a noisy measure of the true proportion, where the
variance of the measurement error is calibrated at 1% of the variance.
9.4. Consumption Dispersion: SHF versus HBS. Two measures of durable
and non durable consumption dispersion are used using data from two different
surveys. More specifically, for the SHF, we compute the variance of annual
nominal consumption, using survey weights, computed as follows:
cnom,annuali,t “ 12˚ pImputed Monthly Rentrcode : 2.31s
`Car Purchases{12rcode : 2.74s`House Durables{12rcode : p2.70s
`monthly non durable consumptionrcode : p9.1sq
To convert it to the real consumption ratio, I divide by aggregate consumption.
For the Household Budget Survey, I compute the variance of total consumption
expenditure (code: GASTOT, for those who do not report zero total income),
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which is itself a weighted measure of consumption expenditure for the represen-
tative household of a particular classification. Notice also the survey switched
from the COICOP to the ECOICOP classification in 2016.
9.5. Tax Rates. The raw measures of tax rates broadly co-move before 2009,
while after 2009 it becomes statistically insignificant (Corru 0.75,CI95%“p0.171,0.944q)
and (Corr u´0.16,CI95% “ p´0.717,0.522q) respectively.
Figure 6
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9.6. Proofs.
Proof. of Proposition 1. The model with frictions is represented as follows:
Gpθ1,0qXt “ F pθ1,0qEtpXt`1|Xtq`Lpθ1,0qZt`µt
Plugging in the candidate distorted decision rule: Xt “X‹t `λt and using the
competitive equilibrium conditions for the frictionless model
F pθ1,0q
nxˆnx
P ˚pθ1,0q
nxˆnx
´G˚pθ1,0q
nxˆnx
“ 0
pRpθ1,0qT
nzˆnz
bF pθ1,0q`IzbpF pθ1,0qP ˚pθ1,0q´G˚pθ1,0qqqvecpQpθ1,0qq“´vecpLpθ1,0qq
leads to the following condition:
Gpθ1,0qλt “ EtF pθ1,0qλt`1`µt
Substituting for µt “M1Xt´1`M2Zt and the guess λt “ Hµt and matching
coefficients on Xt´1 and Zt we arrive at
vecpHq “ `M 11bGpθ1,0q´pM1P ‹pθ1, θ2qq1bF pθ1,0q˘´1 vecpM1q
vecpM2q “
`
Inz bpGpθ1,0qH´ Inxq´R1bF pθ1,0qH
˘´1ˆ`pM1Q‹pθ1, θ2qq1bF pθ1,0q˘vecpHq

9.7. Experiment 2: Adverse parameterization pω“ 1.5, β “ 0.97). In this
experiment I lower both the discount factor and the risk aversion coefficient.
This generates weaker motives for precautionary savings, and the expectation
is that agents will now be more exposed to idiosyncratic risk. The question is
therefore whether aggregates are still well approximated empirically despite the
fact that the variance of consumption shares cannot be predicted perfectly by
aggregate shocks.
As evident from the figures below, this is the case. Yet this can be explained
by "approximate aggregation". Since the distribution does not matter, then
it should not matter if the model cannot perfectly track the evolution of the
variance using the aggregate state variables.
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Figure 7. Aggregate Consumption
Figure 8. Variance of Consumption Shares
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Figure 9. Aggregate Capital Stock
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9.8. Mixed Frequency Model for Quarterly Proportion of B˜cont . Using
B˜cont “ p˜t ` ζ˜t as a measurement equation, the true quarterly proportion of
liquidity constrained consumers is extracted using the following mixed frequency
Gaussian linear state space model, where t “ 4pj ´ 1q ` q, t is the quarterly
observation at year j and q “ t1,2,3,4u the within year quarter index:
State Equation (ignoring identities):˜
B˜con4pjq
ζ˜4pjq
¸
“
˜
ρp 0
0 ρζ
¸˜
B˜con4pj´1q`3
ζ˜4pj´1q`3
¸
`
˜
νB˜con,4pjq
νζ˜,4pjq
¸
Observation equation:
˜
p˜o4pjq
B˜con,oj
¸
“
˜
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 ... 0
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8 0 0 ... 0
¸
¨˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˝
B˜con4pjq
B˜con4pj´1q`3
B˜con4pj´1q`2
B˜con4pj´1q`1
B˜con4pj´1q
B˜con4pj´2q`3
B˜con4pj´2q`2
B˜con4pj´2q`1
ζ˜4pj´1q`3
ζ˜4pj´1q`2
ζ˜4pj´1q`1
ζ˜4pj´2q
ζ˜4pj´2q`3
ζ˜4pj´2q`2
ζ˜4pj´2q`1
ζ˜4pj´2q
‹˛‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‚
`v4pjq
where pνB˜con,t,νζ˜,tq „Np0,diagpΣνqq and vt„Np0,diagpΣvqq. The last diagonal
component of Σv is calibrated to the standard error from the estimation of
the proportion of constrained consumers in the SHF survey. The rest of the
components of the diagonal are calibrated to 1% of the variance of the BCS
measure (p˜t).
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Figure 10
9.9. Model for Trends. Let pX1,obst ,X2,obst ,X3,obst q1 denote the three groups
of observables, where the first two groups have a common group specific trend:
Υt “ pΥ1t ,Υ2t q. The state space formulation is as follows:
State Equation:˜
Υt
Xnpt
¸
“
˜
I 0
0 P ‹pθq
¸˜
Υt´1
Xnpt´1
¸
`
˜
pt
Q‹pθqnpt
¸
Observation equation:
Xobst “ S
˜
Υt
Xnpt
¸
` met
where ppt q „Np0,Σpq. The non-zero elements of Σp are those that correspond
two groups and S “ blockdiagpSΥ,Sxq. Sx is a selection matrix. The specifica-
toin accomodates for trends at quarterly and yearly frequency.
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I “
¨˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˝
1 0 0
1 0 0 04
0 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 0
04 1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
‹˛‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‚
SΥ “
¨˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˝
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 04
1 0 0 0
1 0 0
sc scp1`2ρcq scp1`2ρcp1`ρcqq scp1`2ρcp1`ρc`ρ2cqq 0 0 0 0
sc scp1`2ρcq scp1`2ρcp1`ρcqq scp1`2ρcp1`ρc`ρ2cqq 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 smpk 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1`2ρmpk 1`2ρmpkp1`ρmpkq 1`2ρmpkp1`ρmpk`ρ2mpkq
‹˛‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‚
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10. Estimated Trends
Below I plot the estimated trends in consumption level and dispersion, govern-
ment spending, wages and investment as well as the common trend in the ex
ante real rate and the dispersion in the marginal revenue product.
Figure 11
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11. Assessing Fit
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Figure 12. Data against the model based predictions using the Kalman filter.
60
12. Consumption and Investment Fiscal Multipliers
Figure 13. 90% Confidence Sets
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Figure 14. Counterfactuals at Posterior Mode for Θ
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13. Augmented Model with Capital Euler Equation
Augmenting the model with the Capital Euler Equation is not expected to
offer much in terms of identification of the existing parameters in the empirical
model of section 7, unless one is directly interested in the determination on
the distortions to the value of capital. Recall that the individual first order
condition (without habits) is as follows:
ηi,tc
´ω
i,t “ βEtc´ωi,t`1pp1´ δqηi,t`1`p1´ τt`1q
ψ
2 u
2
i,t`1q`vi,t`ϕi,tµi,t
A different way to determine the aggregate implications of inefficiency in capital
accumulation is to re-write the Euler equation in terms of the price of capital.
Dividing the first equation by marginal utility, applying the same type of second
order approximation and aggregating using the joint Λt,t`1 distribution and size
weights ki,tKt , we get that Qt “ βEt
´
Ct`1
Ct
¯´ω Ξt`1
Ξt R
k
t`1`µQt where
Qt :“
ˆ
ηi,t
ki,t
Kt
dΛiptq,µQt :“
ˆ
cωi,tϕi,tµi,t
ki,t
Kt
dΛiptq
and
Rkt “
ˆ
Rki,t
ki,t
Kt
dΛiptq “ p1´ δqQt`p1´ τtq
ˆ
ψ
2 α
Yt
Kt
νpt ´1
νpt
˙
The distortion µQt affects the aggregate value of the capital stock, which will
then have to be linked to all shocks as in the rest of the cases. Moreover, to see
that the distortion λI,t can be linked to Qt, notice that:
λI,t “
ˆ
ιi,t
ηi,t´1
ηi,t
dΛtpiq « It
Qt
pQt´1´V Qt q
where V Qt is the cross sectional dispersion of ηi,t. Assuming that the ex-ante
real rate is actually known at time t, we can also see that Qt “ Et R
k
t`1
Rt`1 `µ
Q
t .
A positive discrepancy between the return to capital and the real interest rate
tomorrow as well as borrowing constraints imply that Qt can be well above one.
Thus, the aggregate shocks that affect the after tax revenue product of capital
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and the distortion µQ will be the key shocks that distort aggregate investment
downwards.
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